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The collection of personal information by smart 
toys causes various privacy concerns. The use of 
personal information has also been subject to 
regulatory acts by different governments. For these 
reasons, smart toy manufacturers need to develop 
effective privacy controls. However, designing usable 
privacy controls remains a challenge. In this paper, we 
sought to identify the main security vulnerabilities 
involved with smart toys that are related to usability and 
may impact users' privacy. To this end, we performed a 
security analysis and usability heuristic evaluations. 
After identifying current vulnerabilities, we create a list 
of design recommendations aiming at enhancing both 
the usability and privacy of smart toy privacy controls.  
We also suggest a revised severity scale to help to 
prioritize the design solutions. 
1. Introduction  
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an ecosystem that is 
transforming all devices to build a smart society [1]. 
These smart devices have benefited consumers in many 
ways, such as smart thermostats placed in the home and 
wearable technology to monitor health and fitness [2]. 
IoT has also influenced children's toys that have 
transformed from simple, stuff toys to Internet-
connected toys that can also communicate and interact 
with children [3], [4]. For example, Hello Barbie, an 
Internet-connected toy from ToyTalk.com and Mattel, 
operates when the button in the belt buckle is pressed, 
and it connects the Hello Barbie doll to the Cloud server 
of ToyTalk.com [5]. CogniToys Dino is another smart 
toy powered by IBM Watson technology that is Cloud-
connected and operates through the Internet. Dino 
works simply as when the child asks questions by voice, 
and Dino that is connected to the Internet listens and 
replies according to the question [6].  These devices can 
provide personalized based services to users by 
collecting data from user contexts such as location, time, 
and weather. The Elemental Path has described the 
functionality of CogniToys Dino as that it gathers child 
personal behavior and preferences such as favorite 
color, favorite games and provides service according to 
their age-appropriate content to interact with them [7]. 
However, the collection and use of such sensitive 
information are subject to regulatory acts, such as the 
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), 
from the United States Federal Trade Commission [8], 
and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
from the European Union [9]. Also, users (or their legal 
guardians) may not consent to such devices collecting 
their personal information. Therefore, smart toy 
manufacturers are required to implement effective 
privacy controls to protect the collected information [4, 
10, 11].   
We have seen in recent years, several privacy 
violations or data breaches, such as the VTech breach 
that resulted in the disclosure of about 6 million children 
records [12]. Table 1 presents some well-known 
children's privacy violations due to ineffective security 
control or privacy malpractice and their respective 
related fines, in US dollars, levied by United States 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) against the company 
violating children's privacy.  
Company Violation Year Fine 
ByteDance  COPPA compliance failure 
with their TikTok app. 
2019 $5.7 
million 




inMobi COPPA violation  - location 
tracking. 
2016 $950,000 
Table 1.  Some Known Privacy Violation and Fines. 
Although the FTC continues to levy hefty fines against 
companies violating COPPA, adopting effective privacy 
controls remains a challenge in the field [13]. To address 
this challenge, we sought to review the main security 
vulnerabilities of some current smart toys and their 





resulting user privacy concerns and impact. For this 
reason, we identified security and usability problems 
that remain present in popular smart toy applications, 
causing vulnerabilities. To overcome these problems, 
we present a list of recommendations for further 
improvements in smart toy technologies.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
presents the background on smart toys, information 
security, privacy, and usability. Section 3 describes the 
method of this study. Section 4 presents the case studies 
we performed to reach our goal. Section 5 presents 
recommendations for future designs of smart toy 
privacy controls. Finally, Section 6 concludes our paper 
and discusses future works.  
2. Background 
    As shown by Albuquerque et al. [14], although 
privacy is difficult to define, it relates to the right of 
people to keep their personal information a secret or not.  
It generally refers to one's desire to set who has access 
to them. This is closely related to the concept of 
confidentiality, which is defined by ISO 27000 as the 
"property that information is not made available or 
disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or 
processes." In this context, confidentiality is an 
extension of privacy but focuses on how the user's 
private information is managed to prevent unauthorized 
users from gaining access. Essential security controls 
established in ISO 27001 required to maintain 
confidentiality can be considered as very important in 
establishing and protecting privacy. 
The literature has diverse approaches focusing on 
the privacy and security issues of IoT devices, among 
which smart toys have an increasing interest. Hung et al. 
identified privacy requirements at the legislative level 
and privacy laws that are applicable to children's smart 
toys. They showed that, as the physical safety of a child 
is mandatory, a framework was needed to attain the 
privacy of the child by reducing the sensitive data 
collection and its retention. This included a parent or 
guardian to control their child-sensitive data [15]. 
Meanwhile, Rafferty et al. proposed a conceptual model 
of privacy rule for smart toys, IoT devices, and mobile 
services. In the model, parents and legal guardians are 
owners of child information, which is in accordance 
with a data privacy act known as COPPA (Children's 
Online Privacy Protection Act). COPPA allows parents 
and legal guardians to monitor and regulate the 
information that is gathered online. Parents must give 
their consent to rules (access rules) about sharing their 
child's personal data [10].  
McReynolds et al. conducted a survey on parents 
and children who play with internet-enabled toys. They 
emphasize the survey on worries that parents and their 
children have when playing with smart toys, observing 
that many children were not even aware that their 
conversations are being recorded. They have pointed out 
that the toy designers should design toys in a way that 
alerts children before recording instead of the red 
blinking light that is not spotted by children. They have 
also suggested to toy manufacturers not to keep the 
recordings of child conversations for a long time and 
delete them in a week or allow parents to delete the 
recorded conversations permanently. Their study also 
found that many parents require parental control over 
the toy, such as the function to turn off the Internet on 
the toy or to manage its responses to children's questions 
[4].      Dhanhani et al. suggested that toy manufacturers 
should consider forensic measures while designing 
internet-enabled toys [16]. Rafferty presented an access 
control model and framework intended to protect the 
location of children playing with Internet-connected 
toys [17]. 
Finally, Holloway et al. [18] show the potential 
benefits of smart toys (e.g., enthusiasm and enjoyment). 
Meanwhile, they outline various emerging privacy and 
security issues found in smart toys. According to them, 
ToyTalk (responsible for the Hello Barbie) argues that 
it is not possible to prevent children from providing 
personal information. Nevertheless, ToyTalk's policies 
state that if the company comes across any recordings 
with personal information, the company will delete it. In 
this sense, Holloway et al. argue that the security 
protection of smart toys depends on parental choice over 
parental control. Also, they argue that this may involve 
other security breaches. 
2.1. Privacy and Smart Toys 
As per Hung et al. [3], a smart toy is: 
a device consisting of a physical toy component that 
connects to one or more toy computing services to 
facilitate gameplay in the Cloud through networking 
and sensory technologies to enhance the functionality 
of a traditional toy.  
Smart toys establish two-way communication with the 
child [10]. The smart toy vendor is able to provide 
personalized based services through the collection of 
data from users' contexts. Smart toys often gather the 
childs' personal behavior and preferences, such as 
favorite color, favorite game, and in order to provide 
age-appropriate content for the child to interact with the 
toy. By interacting with smart toys, the toy can gather 
personalized information about the child. In most cases, 
the guardian and the child both have no idea of the 
concept of privacy and how to protect it.  Consequently, 
children reveal their personal information while playing 
with these toys without the awareness of the dangers of 
such information revel [10]. The personal information 
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used and collected by these connected devices can be 
hacked; as such, sparking various security and privacy 
concerns. The concerns become exponential with 
respect to sensitive personal information about children, 
as all interactions of a child with the Internet-enabled 
toy are stored somewhere else on a remote server [10]. 
Because of the challenging nature of privacy and 
connected devices, some manufacturers of smart toys 
may not design security and privacy as a top 
requirement.  
The literature shows that some smart toys available 
on the market remain with security threats. Mattel Hello 
Barbie, My friend Cayla and i-Que robot are examples 
of such toys [19]. For instance, parental control is 
needed for the proper functioning and more security of 
the toy [10, 16]. Hello Barbie is designed to be the 
child's best friend, talking and sharing secrets [18, 20]. 
The doll has built-in features that record every 
conversation between child and Barbie and stores this 
conversation in a cloud database. This database is also 
shared with the child's parents, which gives the 
impression that parents (or legal guardians) have 
absolute control over the conversations. Hello, Barbie 
application also includes a feature to share the 
recordings of children's conversations with the toy on 
social networks. As a matter of fact, there is a possible 
threat to sharing the collected data with third parties. 
This indicates that in both ways, Hello Barbie is not 
keeping a secret [18, 20].  
Holloway and Green [18] discuss that security 
specialists can easily get access to the names of all Wi-
Fi networks to which the toy connects, the user account 
details, and even the sound files of pre-recorded 
responses of Barbie conversations when the doll is not 
connected to the Cloud. In 2015, VTech Electronics 
LLC, a company that develops connected tablets for 
children, suffered a data breach of almost 6 million 
children and 4 million parents all over the world [12]. 
The information included parents' and child names, 
birthdate, pictures, gender, and account password. 
VTech failed to protect the Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII) of parents and their children that they 
have collected for the use of their connected tablets [21, 
32]. However, these kinds of data breaches elevate 
concerns about the privacy of users' data; and rightful 
question whether these smart toy manufacturers are 
considerably doing enough to implement security 
controls necessary to address privacy risks of the 
collected consumer data. 
According to the privacy policy of CogniToys Dino 
[22], the Personal Information provided by parents 
about themselves and their children may include name, 
home address, contact information, current location, 
email address. As one can see, this information is 
privacy sensitive and sufficient to identify users. The 
policies state that information is only used for the 
internal purpose, to give a personalized experience to 
users, and that the toy company is not going to reveal 
customers' collected Personal Information to third 
parties without the consent of users, except as described 
in their Privacy Policy. This may allow the company to 
disclose some information to third parties without 
identifying the identity of the parent or child. For 
example, to attest that smart toy companies are 
considering the privacy of children's information in their 
care, a Ranking Member, Nelson, of the US Senate, 
requested the security and privacy policies from few 
famous connected devices and toy companies. He also 
requested information about how they collect, use, and 
secure user personal information. The companies in 
question provided him with the report that reveals the 
smart toys gather much information, including the 
Personal Identifiable Information of parents and their 
children. The companies also showed that they have 
security policies for user data protection applied. 
However, the security vulnerabilities in Fisher-Price 
Smart Toy Bear uncovered that they were unsuccessful 
in protecting and securing customer data. These 
incidents elevated questions of whether smart toy 
manufacturing companies are considering the security 
of consumer data as their top priority [21].  
Due to privacy concerns related to smart toys, 
studies have analyzed the security of these devices in 
order to identify vulnerabilities. Somerset Recon Inc 
[23] analyzed the security of Hello Barbie, one of the 
first smart toys to become popular in the market. They 
have identified security vulnerabilities that can be 
considered as privacy vulnerabilities due to its impact 
on privacy, as we present in Table 2.  A similar security 
analysis is made available by Pen Test Partners [24] on 
the Dino smart toy, another popular smart toy in the 
market. We also included these analyses in Table 2. 
 
# Information Security  
Vulnerabilities 
Privacy Impact 
1 "Weak passwords" [23]. This vulnerability will 
allow attackers to brute 
force user account 
credentials remotely and 
infiltrate victim user 
accounts. However, we 
have found that this issue 
has been resolved now. 
2 "No Password Brute Force 
Protections" [23]. 
This vulnerability allows 
attackers to brute force user 
mobile app account 
passwords remotely and 
infiltrate victim user 
accounts. An attacker is 
also able to gain access to 
audio conversations of the 
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toy with a child as it is 
accessible through user 
accounts. However, as we 
observed, it has been 
resolved now.  
3 "Hello Barbie device uses 
unencrypted Wi-Fi network" 
[23]. 
This vulnerability allows 
attackers to perform a man 
in the middle attack by 
joining open and 
unencrypted Barbie's Wi-Fi 
network. However, this Wi-
Fi connection is only 
available in pairing mode 
by pressing two buttons on 
the device. There is a 
possibility that the child 
might unknowingly press 
these two buttons and open 
the Wi-Fi device network. 
We observed that this 
vulnerability had not been 
resolved by now. 
 "Hello Barbie device does 
not require unique 
authentication to modify the 
configuration of the device" 
[23]. 
This vulnerability could 
cause the toy to use an 
account created by the 
attacker, and in this way, an 
attacker can listen to audio 
conversations. An attacker 
could also gain access to the 
user account credentials 
from the toy web 
application and insert 
malicious audio 
conversation files to the 
victim user account [23]. 
However, we observed that 
it had been resolved now. 
4 "Audio files can be accessed 
without authentication" [23]. 
An attacker can get the 
URL of an audio 
conversation that is stored 
on CloudFront without 
authentication, and the file 
is accessible even if the user 
changes the account 
password. The problem 
faced by an attacker while 
accessing those audio 
conversation files would be 
that URL paths to all audio 
files are random [23]. We 
observed that this security 
vulnerability had not been 
resolved yet. 
5 Cross-Site Scripting: The 
web Interface of the toy, 
which is available over Wi-
Fi and is used in 
configuration mode, is 
vulnerable to a few security 
issues. This includes 
persistent Cross-Site 
Scripting (XSS) attack [24]. 
The web page does not 
perform input validation or 
sanitization while entering 
the SSID, and by submitting 
the script such as 
"<script>alert (1) 
</script>" [31], the code 
gets executed and displays 
"1". An attacker could 
exploit this vulnerability 
and perform Persistent XSS 
and Cross-Site Forgery 
Request attacks. As we 
observed, this security 
vulnerability has not been 
resolved yet. 
6 Use of HTTP for 
transferring sensitive 
information: The web 
interface of the toy is used to 
add or modify Network 
SSID. The SSIDs that are in 
use or to set a new SSID 
with different priority levels 
are displayed on the web 
interface. The users can 
select any security type and 
enter a password to connect 
to SSIDs. This web page 
uses an unsecured 
connection HTTP, i.e., 
http://192.xxx.x.x, and it 
could be easily accessed by 
the hacker [24]. 
When the toy is in 
configuration mode, a 
hacker can perform 
malicious activities such as 
Man in the Middle (MITM) 
by sniffing the traffic 
between the user and the 
toy and stealing any 
sensitive information. 
However, it would be better 
to set login credentials to 
enter the web interface of 
the toy. As observed in our 
study, this security 
vulnerability has not been 
resolved yet. 
Table 2. Smart toy Vulnerabilities and  Privacy Impact  
Although security issues are important to identify 
privacy vulnerabilities, studies have shown that 
usability also plays an important role in enhancing users' 
efficacy, efficiency, and satisfaction with different 
privacy controls [12, 25]. For this reason, in this paper, 
we conduct an empirical case study to evaluate the 
usability of examples of smart toys aiming to identify 
privacy vulnerabilities. 
2.1.1. Usable security issues in smart toys 
Recent studies have shown that usability may play an 
important role in enabling laypeople (as 
parents/guardians) to effective use of privacy controls 
[12], [21]. The usability concept is defined by the 
ISO/TR 9241 as [26] as  
the extent to which a system, product, or service can 
be used by specified users to achieve specified goals 
with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in a 
specified context of use.   
We describe a deeper relationship between usability and 
privacy controls by first considering the definition of 
usability. In regards to the usability definition, and 
considering the context of privacy controls, "specified 
goals" (part of usability definition) are control 
objectives "(...) to be achieved as a result of 
implementing controls" [27]. Because privacy controls 
are provided and configured by means of user interfaces, 
poor usability of such interfaces (e.g., because of poor 
effectiveness) may be seen as a weakness of the privacy 
control process and can be exploited by a threat. In other 
words, and considering that the "weakness of an asset or 
control (3.14) that can be exploited by one or more 
threats (3.74)" is an information security vulnerability, 
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poor usability of privacy controls may be seen as 
information security vulnerabilities [27, 28]. 
As the range of privacy threats increases, laypeople 
are often required to make security decisions [29, 41] by 
understanding privacy concepts or policies. However, 
privacy policies are usually long and complex [30], and 
usable tools for laypeople are still needed [12, 21]. To 
design usable tools of any kind, usability evaluations are 
essential [31]. These methods can be distinguished 
between those that depend on end-users to be performed 
(use-based evaluations) and those that depend on 
inspectors to be performed (inspection-based 
evaluations) [42]. Among inspections, heuristic 
evaluation (HE) is popular and allows practitioners to 
diagnose usability problems on the interface [33].  
3. Methods 
In this study, we sought to identify the main security 
vulnerabilities involved in the smart toys' context that 
have an impact on users' privacy. For this reason, we 
complemented the findings from a literature overview 
(shown in Section 2.1) with additional security analysis 
and two empirical usability inspections. The Security 
analysis stage is a security analysis of one smart toy 
technology to confirm the findings from the literature 
and, potentially, identify new issues. This stage can also 
confirm whether the set of security vulnerabilities is 
saturated, and no new vulnerabilities are found. The 
usability evaluation stage comprises the evaluation of 
two smart toy privacy controls. This is performed to 
identify human vulnerabilities involved with smart toy 
privacy controls that are due to usability aspects. To this 
end, we performed heuristic evaluations. Heuristic 
evaluations can identify information security 
vulnerabilities by means of employing usable security 
heuristics as criteria for the judgment [28]. Heuristic 
evaluation returns situations when users might face 
usability problems when setting their privacy controls. 
This may lead to privacy risks. Our goal is to identify 
usable privacy issues that can help the literature to 
understand how to improve the interface of smart toys' 
privacy controls.  
3.1. Participants 
Both the security analysis and usability evaluation were 
carried out by experts. The security analysis was 
conducted by two security experts (both Ph.D. students). 
Meanwhile, the usability evaluation was an expert 
review [34], conducted by two usability experts (a 
usability researcher, Ph.D., and a Ph.D. student). To 
conduct the usability evaluation of smart toys' privacy 
controls, we considered the privacy controls as available 
on current application markets. Due to time constraints, 
and because the literature has previous security analysis 
on smart toys, we only performed the security analysis 
on toy Alpha. For the usability evaluation, since the 
literature still lacks usability evaluation of privacy 
issues on smart toys, we performed it on both toy Alpha 
and Beta.  
3.2. Material 
We employed two smart toy technologies as a subject 
for the experiments. We used the "Privacy not included" 
website from Mozilla [35] to choose both smart toys. To 
keep the anonymity of the brands and their privacy, we 
refer to the technologies as toys Alpha and Beta. The 
smart toy brands mentioned previously in various 
sections of this work have no direct connection to toy 
Alpha or Beta used in this section of our work. Toy 
Alpha is a smart interactive toy that makes 
conversations with kids. It is connected to a Cloud-
based Artificial Intelligence machine for question 
answering, which operates through Wi-Fi. The setting 
of Alpha is made available with the free app, which is 
available to be downloaded for Android or iOS-based 
phones. For feasibility reasons, the Android-based 
mobile app of the toys has been used throughout the case 
study. The Web interface of Beta had input validation 
errors such as Cross-Site Forgery Request and Persistent 
XSS. Moreover, it uses unencrypted communication 
channel HTTP instead of HTTPS to transmit sensitive 
information. It also allows weak login credentials while 
creating a user account. We employed toy Alpha for the 
security analysis and one usability heuristic evaluation. 
Beta is an internet-connected toy designed and 
developed by a traditional toy company, and a 
computing company focused on talking toys. It is aimed 
to communicate with children, while all conversations 
between Beta and the child are stored in the Cloud and 
can be accessed or managed by parents on a dedicated 
website. Toy Beta can be easily configured with the 
application available to be downloaded for Android or 
iOS-based phones on their app store. We employed toy 
Beta for the second heuristic evaluation. 
4. Results and Discussions 
4.1. Security Analysis 
The security analysis was based on both mobile and 
Web/desktop versions of a smart toy privacy control. To 
complement the analysis, we used the Wireshark [36] 
tool to clearly check what happens in the toy connection 
with the Cloud. The privacy vulnerabilities and their 
impacts are indicated in Table 3. 
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# Information Security 
Vulnerability 
Privacy Impact 
1 Weak password This vulnerability will allow 
attackers to gain access to 
users' accounts and all 
private and sensitive 
information about the user. 
This security vulnerability 
has not been resolved. 
2 No Password Brute 
Force Protections 
This vulnerability allows an 
attacker to brute force user 
passwords and infiltrate the 
victim user account and gain 
access to users' data. This 
security vulnerability has 
not been resolved. 
3 Use of HTTP on the 
password reset web 
page (identified by 
using Wireshark) 
If an attacker sniffs network 
traffic when the user reset 
its password, the attacker 
would be able to access the 
password reset page and 
hijack the user's account. As 
observed in our study, this 
security vulnerability has 
not been resolved yet. 
Table 3.Vulnerabilities and related Privacy Impact 
Our analysis could only find the three vulnerabilities, as 
listed in Table 3. Because all of these vulnerabilities 
were previously identified in the literature, we assumed 
that the set of vulnerabilities is saturated, and no further 
analysis is necessary at the moment. 
4.2. Heuristic Evaluation I 
For the first heuristic evaluation, we evaluated the Web 
browser-based application of privacy control for toy 
Alpha. We adopted the heuristics of Jaferian et al. [37] 
as usability criteria to inspect the privacy control. As 
indicated in Salgado et al. [38], these are the most 
appropriate usability heuristics for inspections of 
parental privacy controls of smart toys. All of the 
potential usable security vulnerabilities are new 
(diagnosed in our study) and were not resolved yet. 
They are described in Table 4. 
 
# Usability Problem (Information 
Security Vulnerability) 
Reference 
1 No alternative audio description: 
Users can only review the 
conversation content by listening to 





review large audio conversation files 
to identify a child's privacy breaches. 
This may be effortful for them. 
2 Excessive visibility for 
recommended audios: Users may 
only review recommended audio 
conversation files because they are 






3 Repetitive security tasks: There is 
no clear way of identifying which 
audio conversation files have 






4 Poor visibility of privacy policies 
after login: Right after login, users 
are required to set up the child's 
information and connect the toy. 
During this task period, there is no 
indication of privacy policies 
("Provide rules and constraints" 




5 Lacking audio control: Users 
cannot control the audio execution 
("analyze historical information" 
[36]). If they need to go to a specific 
part of the audio, they must listen to 






6 Excessive deletion: Users unable to 
delete parts of the file ("limit the 
awareness" [36]) that may contain 
sensitive information of the audio 
conversation. Instead, they must 





7 Poor keyboard navigation: Users 
may face difficulties to navigate 
using the keyboard ("allow the 






Table 4. Alpha - Usability Problem and Reference. 
As indicated in Table 4, most (three out of seven) of the 
usability problems relate to the Heuristic #1—Visibility 
of activity status [37], followed by Heuristic #2—
History of actions and changes on artifacts [37] (two out 
of seven). To some extent, this was expected because 
usability heuristics are usually ordered according to its 
explanatory power [39]. Although we could perform the 
heuristic evaluation to identify the vulnerabilities, rating 
a severity for the findings was not an easy task. Because 
all of the issues are related to information security, 
highly important to the application, we could not rate the 
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severity of problems employing the traditional severity 
scale as presented by Nielsen [40]. For this reason, in 
Section 5, we recommend the use of a revised severity 
scale, which we created to address the characteristics of 
usability problems in privacy control tools. 
4.3. Heuristic Evaluation II 
For the usable security evaluation of Toy Beta, we 
adopted its free mobile app for iOS devices. As for 
heuristic evaluation, We adopted the heuristics of 
Jaferian et al. [36] as usability criteria to inspect the 
usability of toy Beta privacy control. All of the potential 
human vulnerabilities are new (diagnosed in our study) 
and were not resolved yet. They are described in Table 
5.  
# Usability Problem (Information 
Security Vulnerability) 
Reference 
8 Lacking help with password 
strength: There is no indication of 
password strength while users are 
creating it. This is necessary to 
support the "freedom to choose 





9 Lacking indication of password 
requirements: There is no 
indication of password 
requirements (e.g., number of 






10 Privacy Policy on the external 
website: The app opens its privacy 
policies on an external website 
without providing any 




11 Lacking visibility for the privacy 
policy link: The privacy policy link 
receives less visibility than account 
information and the next button. 
Because this is a sensitive app, 





12 Confusing user profile creation: 
The app does not indicate that the 
account (being created) belongs to 







13 Lacking privacy notice: The app 
does not inform users when 
sensitive child information is being 





14 Lacking cancelation of information 
sharing: The app does not provide 
an option to cancel (undo) 
information sharing. After users 
insert children's names and dates of 
birth, there is no alternative to 







15 Lacking information about the 
connection with mobile Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) assistant: The app 
offers a connection with mobile AI 
assistance, but there is no clear 
explanation of what information 





16 Menu lacking the option to manage 
a child's information: The app asks 
for both parents' and child's 
information, but there is no 
indication of where to manage the 







Table 5. Beta- Usability Problem and Reference. 
As one can see, we diagnosed two times more usability 
problems with the privacy control of toy Beta in 
comparison with toy Alpha. This fact does not mean that 
the privacy control of toy Beta is worse than the privacy 
control of toy Alpha. As we understand, this is due to 
the fact that toy Beta provides privacy control with more 
information about privacy policies. On the one hand, it 
is important to provide all the necessary information for 
users about their information privacy. On the other 
hand,  this may implicate more problems related to 
Heuristic #4—Rules and constraints [37]. As indicated 
by Table 5, most of the problems found were related to 
the Heuristic #4—Rules and constraints (three out of 
nine problems) or to the Heuristic #1—Visibility of 
activity status (three out of nine problems). From these 
findings, we raise the question if privacy controls with 
more policy descriptions are prone to more situations 
that may contradict the Heuristic #4—Rules and 
constraints. Future research can investigate this topic. 
As in the heuristic evaluation of toy Alpha, the second 
most preferred heuristic in this evaluation was also 
Heuristic #2—History of actions and changes on 
artifacts. It seems that The first two heuristics of 
Jaferian et al. [37] are, indeed, those with the highest 
explanatory power, justifying the order of heuristics. 
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5. Recommendations for the Design of 
Usable Privacy Controls 
In this work, we list nine information security 
vulnerabilities. Six out of these nine vulnerabilities are 
retrieved from the literature, while the other three were 
identified by us in this work. These vulnerabilities are 
not usability related and motivate us to recommend 
attention for further development of smart toy privacy 
controls by means of: (i) do not use HTTP for 
transferring sensitive information; (ii) validate and 
sanitize input to avoid Cross-Site Scripting (XSS); (iii) 
require encrypted Wi-Fi; (iv) protect against remote 
brute force attacks on users' passwords; and (v) require 
authentication prior to privacy control. 
Although these recommendations are important, we 
are not the first to reinforce the importance of them since 
they are mostly based on the literature. On the contrary, 
all the 16 human vulnerabilities discussed in this study 
comes from our study. From these findings, we raised 
the question if privacy controls with more policy 
descriptions are prone to more situations that may 
contradict the Heuristic #4—Rules and constraints. 
Future research can investigate this topic. From these 
vulnerabilities, we suggest recommendations to 
improve the usability of smart toy privacy controls. 
These recommendations are a result of applying the 
heuristics of Jaferian et al. [37] in the heuristic 
evaluations of this study. We present the 
recommendations in Table 6, along with its sources, 
which are the usability problems, as numbered (#) in 
tables 4 and 5, that justify the recommendations. 
Recommendation Usability 
Problem (#)  
Provide alternatives to efficiently perceive 
privacy controls. Users should not be 
obligated to interact with privacy controls 
by audio if they find the text more efficient 
to review information. 
#1 
Perception of control over the perception 
of information: The main focus of privacy 
controls should be on providing the 
perception of the control instead of 
providing the perception of the 
information collected. Users should not 
perceive excessive information competing 
with control options. 
#2 
Apply the Heuristic #2—History of 
actions and changes on artifacts [36] to 
provide users with the perception of which 
information is in accordance with users' 
control preferences. 
#3 
Provide privacy policies access at every 
screen and keep them consistent with the 
interface design.  
#4, #10 
Provide flexible controls. Users should be 
able to opt for fine-grained controls, such 
as deleting specific sections of the audio.  
#5, #6 
Provide efficient controls, such as 
supporting keyboard navigation for 
experienced users. 
#7 
Nudge users towards the creation of 
strong passwords. 
#8, #9 
Provide privacy notices about ongoing 
data sharing. 
#11, #13 
Clearly distinguish settings for children's 
information from parent's (or legal 
guardians') information. This is due to 
the need to provide information about the 
child, who is the smart toy user, and 
parents (or legal guardians) for 
authentication in the privacy control. 
#12, #16 
Provide clearly indicated alternatives to 
undo unwanted data sharing. This is to 
mitigate the consequences of laypeople 
giving wrong consents. Although this 
seems impossible, because we cannot 
affirm that the data has not been seen by 
anyone else, provide ways to request data 
deletion from a third party. 
#14 
Provide efficient control connection with 
artificial intelligence assistants. Users 
should know what information the 
assistant can access, and voice interactions 
should be human-like conversations. 
#15 
Table 6. Recommendations to Enhance Usability and 
Privacy of Smart Toys. 
In the growing market of smart toys, security gets 
critical as users may be children and novices to the cyber 
world hidden behind the attractive toys. Because of the 
sensitive nature of children's personal information, a toy 
manufacturing company should design smart connected 
toys with security as a priority. Investment in robust 
security and continued updates to security measures are 
critical. Toy manufacturing companies should also 
apply acceptable data privacy practices such as a 
collection of only data that is required for the main 
operations of the smart toy and to retain collected 
information for the only limited time that is necessary 
with valid reasoning. Our recommendations aim to 
support companies in the design process for better smart 
toy privacy controls.  
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In addition to our recommendations, and based on 
our experience with the case studies, we understand that 
a new severity rating scale is necessary to fully indicate 
the severity of usable privacy problems. We need a 
severity rating scale that represents privacy implications 
in it, along with usability issues. For this reason, we 
adapted Nielsen's severity scale [40] to suggest the new 
usable privacy severity scale:  
1. Cosmetic: usability problems, not related to policy 
generation/agreement, that may not stop users from 
using the interface. 
2. Minor: usability problems, not related to policy 
generation/agreement, that may stop users from 
using the interface 
3. Major: This leads to generating a wrong policy. 
4. Catastrophe: leads to agreeing with the wrong 
policy. 
Although new, our severity scale is based on 
Nielsen's [40] traditional severity scale. This might 
influence practical aspects of employing our new scale 
because it keeps the span of four levels and lean 
descriptions. Nevertheless, future studies are still 
necessary to validate our severity scale in empirical 
experiments.  
6. Conclusions  
In this paper, we sought to provide recommendations 
aiming to enhance the usability and privacy of smart toy 
privacy controls. To this end, we identified security and 
usability problems that remain as vulnerabilities in 
popular smart toy applications. From nine information 
security vulnerabilities, which include the literature (see 
Table 2), we recommend five security practices in 
Section 5. From the 16 usability problems identified in 
our study, we composed a list of 11 usable security 
design recommendations to enhance the privacy aspects 
of smart toys, as presented in Table 6. Our 
recommendations may be used along different stages of 
design, from initial requirements to evaluation (testing 
stage) criteria. In addition, we also create a new severity 
scale focused on usability problems in the context of 
privacy policies.  
Future studies may diagnose additional problems 
from similar IoT applications and evolve our 
recommendations towards a standard. They can also 
explore the use of our recommendations as criteria for 
usability inspections in the domain, which may include 
the revised severity rating scale. 
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